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Abstract 
The article analyses Fiji politics by utilising the analytical framework established by neo-
Gramscian scholars, who emphasise the role of social forces and constitutive moments in the 
making of history. Elite hegemony in Fiji was founded on the hegemony of indigenous chiefs, 
local and transnational capital and indigenous nationalism. These three pillars of elite hegemony 
are central arguments of critical and cultural neo-Gramscian theories on power, social forces and 
neoliberal economic discourses and this neo-Gramscian approach provides both ontological and 
epistemological frameworks for the study of both hegemony and counter-hegemony in Fiji and 
reflect convergence, divergence, mobilisation, resistance, and control, and inform counter history 
and social reframing, where ethnic social forces collide with inter-ethnic alliances, creating new 
political counter-hegemonic paradigms that usher in new historical and social trajectories. 
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Introduction 
Gramscian analysis is focused on two forms of discourses – political power and historical 
processes – and these inform domination, resistance, class warfare, hegemony, counter hegemony 
and social forces as constitutive moments where social and historical elements converge to create 
new deliberative moments. Hegemony is achieved through the combination of consensus and 
coercion with ideas, institutions, culture and history assembled according to the visions of the 
ruling class or the elite (Glassman, 2013: 241-257), who control political, economic and social 
discourses by manipulating the socio-economic and legislative structures of the society. Most 
importantly, hegemonic discourses are based on an overt neoliberal rhetoric (Gill, 2003; 2008; 
2015) of laissez faire (Friedman, 1962; Friedman and Friedman, 1980; Fukuyama, 1989), small 
government, managerialism2 (Magretta, 2012), instrumentalism3 and excessive positivism (Dewey, 
1933), where masses are subjugated to elite controls. In the neoliberal hegemony, individual and 
societies are reduced to economic and “market” units, subjected to efficiency, productivity, and 
performance measures, which are benchmarked to the neoliberal economy, small government, 
and disruptions caused by digitisation (Pellizoni and Ylonen, 2012). The consequences of elite 
                                                          
1 Corresponding author: Dr Sanjay Ramesh, University of Sydney. Email: sanjay.ramesh@sydney.edu.au. 
2  Managerialism posits a hypothesis that nothing meaningful in organisational discourse can exist outside 
management control within the capitalist system. 
3  Instrumentalism theory asserts that nothing exists outside known knowledge. Background knowledge then 
becomes defining cognitive authority on the subject being discussed. 
 
Sanjay Ramesh                                                                                                                       | 283 
 
hegemony are environmental4 degradation (Clammer, 2016: 118), income and wealth disparities 
between the rich and the poor, rising poverty, rampant homelessness, social isolation of the 
vulnerable and marginalisation of the majority (Tavanti, 2014: 170). Elite hegemony is 
undemocratic, oppressive and socially irresponsible and policies of this group are focused on 
excessive accumulation of wealth, reduction in public services, low wages, and tax incentives to 
foreign investors, transnational companies and local developers. Moreover, hegemony of the elite 
is a kind of “solidarity of popular beliefs” (Liguori, 2015: 50) that binds the capitalist ruling class 
together. 
Counter hegemony names challenges to the elite hegemony and attempts at creating alternative 
historical and political discourses, where elite and ruling classes discourses are challenged and 
reframed within an alternative sociological and historical ideological framework centred on 
deliberative social forces. Counter hegemony is a kind of social reorganisation, where human 
beings are conceptualised primarily as social beings with complex needs, which require careful 
social policy programming and state intervention. These social units are informed by social and 
historical discourses aimed at emphasising social programs as central to public policy, rather than 
economic and elite outcomes of neoliberalism. Moreover, these alternative discourses are based 
on recasting culture, history and social forces of the ruling class to establish oppositional 
strategies, where non-elite and more broad-based deliberative forms of political, social and 
economic discourses are encouraged and embedded within the civil society with an aim to 
promote true participatory and deliberative democracy, instead of elite politics of disinformation 
and structural and legislative manipulation of the socio-economic system (Filippini, 2017: 93). 
Under the counter hegemonic framework, market forces and technological innovation are 
subjected to state regulation, and productivity and performance are not measured as quantitative 
indices but as social outcomes informed by community engagement, evidence-based decisions 
and robust social policies aimed at bridging inequality and social marginalisation. 
The reinterpretation of the work of the Italian scholar, Antonio Gramsci, has allowed for the 
establishment of multiple level epistemologies for framing the analysis of historical, social, 
economic, and political hegemony and counter hegemony (Rosengarten, 2014). These 
epistemologies or knowledge bases are concerned with deliberative forms of engagement, 
resistance and mobilisation, where ordinary citizens are empowered through tactical political 
organisation, embedded in the collective action from non-elite voices, aimed at emphasising the 
centrality and the utility of deliberation and social outcomes in the local and the global political 
economy (Tortosa, 2012: 103-126). These non-elite deliberative voices are concerned with gender 
equality, indigenous rights, protection of minorities, social programs, economic justice, and inter-
ethnic and multicultural political discourses and are vehemently opposed to the mainstream 
ideology based on racism, control and domination by the elite.  
Historical constitutive moments are ontological expressions of alternate political, social and 
historical solutions, where elite structures are re-examined and challenged and new political 
                                                          
4 John Clammer (2016) argues that environmental degradation has a long-term impact on the planet. According to 
him, “this issue is of paramount importance not only because it addresses the question of the continuance of life on 
earth as we now know it (and certainly of human life), but equally because it poses fundamental ontological 
questions, of which the most significant is whether to be human is to be separated from (and presumably “above”) 
the other life forms that inhabit the same biosphere as ourselves?” 
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paradigms premised on collective social engagement are established. In this context, social, 
political and economic structures, culture, history, ethnicity and social forces, including conflicts 
between the capitalist elite and marginalised voices, provide for deeper analysis of the dynamics 
of history and society. It is here that constitutive historical moments take shape primarily as an 
anti-neoliberal discourse, framed around deliberation, mobilisation, resistance and collective 
action. Neo-Gramscian scholarship has played an important role in informing mobilisation and 
deliberation of marginalised groups and it is within this analytical framework that I will discuss 
the neo-Gramscian approaches and how they can be utilised to understand historical and political 
hegemony and counter hegemony in Fiji, which has a history of contested culture and a political 
legacy of ethnic tensions and conflict. The former, however, has emerged as a pervasive social 
force in Fiji, where struggles for political hegemony within the indigenous community continue 
to cause instability, factionalisation and fragmentation of the indigenous polity. The historical 
constitutive moment for Fiji was achieved with the alliance among the indigenous chiefs, the 
indigenous nationalists and local business and transnational classes, which established hegemonic 
and authoritarian historic blocs to counter deliberative movements for change, social and 
economic justice and interethnic collaboration. The countervailing socio-historical momentum of 
anti-neoliberal social and political forces created its own social and historical trajectories, 
undermining elite narratives. 
The constitutive moment in Fiji is located in the critical and cultural neo-Gramscian discourses 
on power, history and social forces and these three elements are inter-related and re-align 
throughout Fiji problematic history to create new political and social discourses, including new 
cultural epistemology and social ontology in the form of control and resistance, anti-
establishment activism, agitations for equality, protests against transnational local capital, and 
inter-ethnic alliances. The chiefly political hegemony in Fiji, established in 1970, was premised on 
the liberal economic ideology, which in the 1980s mutated into a neo-liberal variant that allowed 
transnational and local businesses to exploit indigenous and Indo-Fijian labour. The industrial 
relations structure encouraging docile and flexible labour was established by the Fiji government, 
which promoted an indigenous hierarchy, where privilege and control were seen by mostly 
indigenous Fijians as a 'natural' socio-economic order supported by indigenous nationalism and 
the neoliberal economic visions of the ruling elite, including local businesses and their overseas 
counterparts. Atu Bain (1984: 2) identified exploitation of indigenous Fijian labour in the mining 
industry, where ‘indigenous Fijians were required to form the core of an industrial workforce’. In 
overseas-owned gold mines anti-worker laws were enforced with the support of the government, 
leading to countless industrial disputes in the 1980s. Also, following the military coups in 1987, 
there was growth in the garment industry in the country and Anand Chand (2012: 171-191) 
highlighted exploitation of local indigenous Fijian and Indo-Fijian garment workers who, he 
argued, were at the bottom of the global commodity chain on meagre wages and with poor 
working conditions. The three-tiered structure in Fiji was based on indigenous Fijian chiefly 
political hegemony, an alliance between transnational and local capital and political support from 
indigenous Fijian nationalists. This formed a unique tripartite hegemonic model for Fiji, where a 
capital-centric neoliberal economy operated within the constitution of global capitalism, and each 
of these three tactical alliances established and nurtured an ideological structure to undermine 
counter-hegemony from inter-ethnic alliances between indigenous Fijians and Indo-Fijians. 
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The theoretical origins of what transpired in Fiji can be found in the analytical framework 
established by neo-Gramscian scholars, who emphasise the role of social forces and constitutive 
moments in the making of history. These neo-Gramscian scholars may seem removed from the 
post-colonial history of Fiji but the underlying themes point towards a neoliberal political and 
economic order in Fiji, founded on the repression of labour and exploitation of ethnic divisions 
with a post-colonial political system, framed around the culturally accepted colonial political 
orthodoxy of neo-traditional hierarchy, privilege and power. These three pillars are central 
arguments of critical and cultural neo-Gramscian theories on power, social forces and neoliberal 
economic discourses; and the neo-Gramscian approach provides both ontological and 
epistemological frameworks for Fijian political discourse, which are analysed as constitutive 
moments in history, a kind of reflexivity on convergence, divergence, mobilisation, resistance and 
control that informs counter history and social reframing, where ethnic social forces collide with 
inter-ethnic alliances, creating new political paradigms that usher in new historical and social 
trajectories.  
 
Critical and cultural neo-Gramscian theories 
 
Critical theory was established by Robert Cox at York University in Canada in the early 1980s to 
address the polemic of history and social forces in shaping political orders. Cox utilised 
Gramscian historicism to construct a historical analytical framework that provided a new 
ontology for the analysis of social forces. According to Cox, critical theory is a ‘theory of history 
in the sense of being concerned not just with the past but with a continuous process of historical 
change’ (Cox, 1981: 129). Critical theory is also concerned with real world problems ‘and its aims 
are just as practical as those of problem-solving theory’ (Cox, 1981: 130). For Cox, the objective 
of the historicist approach is to identify alternative social orders and trigger ‘strategic action’ 
(Cox, 1981: 130) for change. Through careful reading of the past, Cox problematised history and 
social forces and reinforced the role of political consciousness, thus assisting analysts in gaining 
understanding of the ‘broader time perspective of historical structures’ (Cox, 1981: 135). 
After rigorously analysing Gramscian theory of hegemony, Cox formulated his critical theory 
analytical framework as consisting of three interrelated ‘categories of social forces’ (Cox, 1981: 
136). Borrowing from Gramsci, these categories included ideas, institutions and material 
capabilities. Ideas, for Cox, were shared understanding of history, institutions were structures that 
had their origins in ideas and history, and material capabilities were technological and 
organisational factors that informed social order. The three categories of social forces operated 
with different permutations and combinations in different states and had the structural power to 
transcend state boundaries. According to Thomas Edward Gillon, Cox is a thinker in the critical 
theory tradition. His work is accepted as historically oriented and social theory, for Cox, is a 
product of an interaction between an evolving historical reality and critical reflection. Cox re-
defined the concept of core and periphery as neither geographic designations nor economic 
zones as such; rather they refer to categories of work. 
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In the transnational mode of production, the periphery is characterised by a cheap, semi-skilled, 
mobile, and disciplined labour force both in the industrialised and less developed countries, 
whereas the core is a more affluent, dominant ruling class that is motivated by a neoliberal 
ideology based on the free market and accumulation of capital. Using the Gramscian conceptual 
framework on superstructure, Cox resolves the internal-external dichotomy of the development 
theory by illustrating that the system of social dependence and under-development is determined 
by the transnational mode of production, which is sustained by an international historic bloc. The 
transnational mode of production is the modus operandi of capitalism that operates globally, 
incorporating vast regions into production relations between the owners of capital and the 
workers. The relationship established by transnational capitalism is one of exploitation where the 
owners of capital emphasise accumulation of wealth as their primary motivation and the workers 
struggle for fair, just and reasonable social conditions for their livelihood and survival. 
While Cox's critical approach had a focus on transnational capitalist class alliances, international 
historic bloc, and their constitutive historical structural power in shaping international political 
order, Stephen Gill focused on the neoliberal transnational hegemony. 
The transnational mode of production was explained by Gill who made adjustments to Gramsci's 
theory of hegemony. Hegemony would be fully achieved when major institutions and forms of 
organisation – economic, social and political – and key values of the dominant state become 
models for emulation in other subordinate states. In this view of hegemony, the patterns of 
emulation are most likely in the core or most developed states, rather than in the less developed 
periphery (Gill, 1990: 47). In essence, what the neo-Gramscian scholars were doing was using 
Gramscian theory – in particular Gramsci’s most important theoretical formulations, hegemony 
and counter-hegemony, to analyse global capitalism and the structural power of capital. The main 
feature of this global capitalism was post-World War II transnational capitalism, which effectively 
integrated a large part of the globe into a single capitalist bloc. However, the whole world was not 
included, since the Soviet bloc and China had put constraints on the limit to capital expansion, 
but this changed with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and following a series of 
economic reforms in China in the 1990s.  
Sustained by an elite capitalist class across the globe, the dominance of transnational capital was 
institutionalised and regularised by the organic intellectuals, who helped cement the link between 
structure and superstructure. According to Gill: 
The organic intellectuals are the ‘concrete articulators’ of the hegemonic ideology which provides 
cohesion for, and helps to integrate, the historic bloc. Intellectuals are not simply producers of ideology, 
they are also ‘organisers of hegemony’, that is, they theorise the way in which hegemony can be developed 
or maintained (Gill, 1990: 49-50). 
While organic intellectuals are articulators of hegemony, they function within a clearly defined 
institutional structure such as the Trilateral Commission. The Commission was created initially as 
a response to a pervasive sense that the international system and the global distribution of power 
were in a state of flux (Gill, 1990: 123). The Trilateral Commission, in the post-war era, became 
the network from which the ideological basis for a capitalist world economy emanated. This 
supra-state institution, however, also assisted in shaping state policies, especially of countries that 
were members of the liberal capitalist bloc. The power of capital had significantly increased its 
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structural capabilities, thus directly challenging and occasionally undermining the relative power 
of the state. Historic structures are shaped by this structural power of capital within the 
transnational mode of production. According to Gill, ‘the staggering flows of transnational 
finance have a much more murky ‘nationality’, with the result that they fit less well into the 
nation-centred analytical categories still quite common in theories of capital-state relations’. In 
fact, the increase in the structural power of capital and the decline in the relative power of the 
state assisted the structural power of business. In particular, Transnational Corporations (TNCs) 
and private firms which operate globally can easily adopt strategies of exit and evasion.  
The rapid growth of transnational corporations and multinational companies after World War II 
had drastically altered core-periphery relations. Within the transnational mode of production, 
core and peripheral economic structures are found in both developing and industrialised 
countries and this blurring of boundaries has increased the structural power of capital.  
According to Stephen Gill (1992), the capitalist market economy of the United States is now ever 
more central in the world economy, although its centrality contains substantial contradictions for 
the rest of the world because of economic interdependence. The changes in the United States 
reflect a global trend, which we can call the internationalisation of the state, a development which 
calls into question the Westphalian model of state sovereignty. Thus, globalisation is linked to, 
and partly engenders, a process of mutation in previous forms of state and political identity. 
According to Gill, the neo-Gramscian framework provides theoreticians with a set of meta-
principles to help explain and interpret the ontology and the constitution of historically specific 
configurations: ‘social ontology rests upon the inter-subjective (historical-subjective) frameworks 
that help to objectify and constitute social life, such as patterns of social reproduction, the 
political economy of production and destruction, of culture and civilisation’ (Gill, 2003: 44).  
The most significant theoretical advancement in the neo-Gramscian scholarship on culture, 
history and ethnicity was heralded by Stuart Hall, who was influenced by Gramsci’s work on 
hegemony and used Gramscian theory to analyse culture and ethnicity in Great Britain. While 
Gill focused on the transnational nature of the global political economy, Hall (1986) sought to 
construct Gramsci’s ideas and categories in a way that transcended divisions between the working 
class and the liberal capitalist system in Great Britain. Hall saw hegemony as an exploitative 
process, where those in control subjugated the powerless to the political structure of 
manipulation and marginalisation. Hall sketched some of the ways in which a Gramscian 
perspective could be used to ‘transform and rework some of the existing theories and paradigms 
in the analysis of racism and related social phenomena’ (Hall, 1986: 23). This was a major 
progress in the reinterpretation of the Gramscian theory because it successfully moved the 
Gramscian analysis from the Italian School to the study of ethnicity and culture in hegemonic 
European states like Great Britain. 
Hall developed an analytical framework around seven key social and cultural concepts: the 
centrality of history in cultural formations, the dialectical aspects of cultural discourses, the non-
reductive approaches to questions of culture, the non-homogenous nature of class, the lack of 
linkages among Gramsci’s key concepts (ideas, institutions and culture), the role of the state in 
ethnic and class struggles, the role of culture in social formations, and the role of ideology in 
ethnicity and culture (Hall, 1986: 23-27). 
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Hall embedded Gramsci in history and in particular in historical processes and historical 
interpretation and argued that history played a role in cultural hegemony and influenced ethnic 
relations within nation states. Hall analysed that ethnic relations were more fluid than was class 
and that ethnic hegemony was sustained by hegemonic ideas, institutions and culture. In essence, 
Hall stated that class was not the only factor that contributed to ethnic hegemony but that there 
were systemic and structural layers that permeated the social terrains of political hegemony. 
Utilising Hall’s thesis on the role of culture and ethnicity in hegemonic formations, Mark Rupert 
argued that Hall’s Gramsci is one which sees history as a complex and contradictory story of 
social self-production under specific cultural circumstances with multiple social identities, 
powers, and forms of agency (Rupert, 1998: 430-431). The multi-layered interaction between 
history, culture, ethnicity and political power provided Hall the epistemological foundation for 
challenging the foundations of racial discrimination in Great Britain (Rupert, 1998: 433). 
Hall’s neo-Gramscian approach to culture and ethnicity has been described by David Andrews as 
a kind of ‘conjuncturalism’ (Andrews, 2002: 113), which re-locates both the problematic of 
cultural studies and the line between culture and society and recognises the complexity of the 
terrain of culture, models of elite/mass, public/private and even centre/margin as specifically 
historical and politically infected descriptors. Hall's conjuncturalism, according to Andrews, is 
“preconfigured on the uniqueness of any historical moment, which has to be reconstructed in 
terms of the levels and trajectories of determination that help to constitute the conjuncture and 
the experience thereof” (Andrews ,2002: 113). The objective for Hall is to locate and 
problematise the questions of ethnicity and culture as historical discourses on political power 
(Bieler and Morton, 2004: 87) which ‘filters through structures of society, economy, culture, 
gender, ethnicity, class and ideology’ and can be utilised for the development of an alternative 
politics and culture. The design of this alternative politics and culture was based on the 
Gramscian war of position, which was a kind of programmatic social action that exposed fault 
lines in the existing capitalist hegemony and proposed social and political alternatives. 
The cultural approach was built on the growing appreciation among neo-Gramscian scholars of 
the critical role of culture and ethnicity as a driving force in social formation and re-focused 
Gramscian analysis towards the study of colonial and post-colonial societies. More importantly, 
these scholars analysed ethnic and cultural divisions, sub-cultures and the hegemonic role of the 
military by re-conceptualising hegemonic formations, counter hegemony and historic blocs, the 
same Gramscian conceptual tools used by Robert Cox in his formulation of critical theory in the 
early 1980s. Building on Hall and Cox, Randolph Persaud and Rob Walker argued that culture 
and ethnicity have been given the epistemological status of silence in international relations and 
international studies and provided alternatives on how questions of culture might be taken up in 
the contemporary analysis of international relations (Persaud and Walker, 2001: 373-377). 
Quoting Michel Ralph Trouillott, Persaud and Walker describe this status of silence as the 
moment of fact creation, the moment of fact assembly, the moment of retrieval and the moment 
of retrospective significance.  
Randolph Persaud argued that there was ‘hesitancy in understanding the generative capacity of 
culture in the configuration and reproduction of domestic social formations’ because it did not fit 
neatly into the state-centric international relations theory. Persaud highlighted that the 
international political order was an aggregation of domestic social formations and as a result 
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effort has to be made to understand the way local ethnic and cultural configurations ‘influence 
core values and ideas’ (Persaud, 2001: 112-128). The central thesis of Persaud was to locate 
dominant ideas in the social relations of power. These social relations are produced at the local 
level by the local capitalist elites who also play a decisive role in the international historic-bloc. 
One of the tenents of the social relations is ethnic or cultural and these are reproduced at both 
the local and the international level and synchronised historically so that the ruling elite continue 
their political hegemony without interruption. 
Cultural analysis highlighted political formations within states and utilised Gramscian theory to 
analyse colonial culture, post-colonial hegemonic formations, sub-culture, counter hegemony and 
politicisation of culture and ethnicity. In 2004, Bob Jessop steered the culture and ethnicity neo-
Gramscian analysis towards the concept of cultural political economy (Jessop, 2004, 2010). There 
is ongoing debate whether the emerging cultural political economy analysis is based on 
Gramscian and Coxian epistemology (Kranke, 2014: 897-907; Shields, Bruff and Macartney, 
2015: 735-737). According to Jessop (2010: 336), cultural political economy is concerned with 
meaning making in the articulation between the economic and the political and their embedding 
in broader sets of social relations. He refers to this as a ‘cultural turn’ in the study of critical 
political economy and grounds it in a theoretical framework with an emphasis on the role of 
evolutionary mechanisms in the production of hegemony, interdependence of co-evolution of 
semiotic (meaning) and extra-semiotic (meta-meaning), significance of technologies in the 
consolidation of hegemony and its contestations, and de-naturalisation of economic and political 
imaginaries (Jessop, 2010: 336-337).  
Jessop (2010: 338) treats the ‘cultural turn’ as social and dialectically related moments of the social 
world from the viewpoint of four interrelated aspects: semiosis (meaning), agency, technologies 
and structure. Meaning, in the production of hegemony for Cultural Political Economy, is 
influenced by the work of Foucault (1970; 1972); the role of agency in hegemony is sociological 
in origin and has a reflexive element embedded in causal analysis (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992), 
and the relevance of technologies in hegemony approximate the Coxian epistemology (Cox, 
1981) on material capabilities. Whilst Jessop (2010: 340) argues that Cultural Political Economy is 
a ‘third way’ between Structuralism and Constructivism, it could be argued that Cultural Political 
Economy is an integrative neo-Gramscian construct with conclusions similar to Cox that there is 
a crisis in neoliberalism (Jessop, 2010: 349). The problematisation of neoliberalism is a form of 
‘vernacular materialism’ that ‘poses questions about the relation of historic bloc formation’ (Sum 
and Jessop, 2013: 202), including historical materialism. Persaud (2001) also problematised social 
forces as hegemonic discourses similar to what Sum and Jessop (2013) have proposed. Persaud’s 
problematisation of mobilisation and control in Jamaica draws on the neo-Gramscian critical 
approach developed by Robert Cox (1981). However, Sum and Jessop utilise Foucault for 
developing their thesis on ‘constructing, producing and circulating bodies of knowledge’ (Sum 
and Jessop, 2013: 203). This epistemic approach is embedded in the understanding of culture and 
the historical forces that shape agency and structure in hegemonic and counter hegemonic 
discourses. 
While the Cultural Political Economy agenda ‘considers how discourse and discursive practices 
condition subjectivities and what role they play in consolidating domination and hegemony’ (Sum 
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and Jessop, 2013: 205), the ‘cultural turn’ that Jessop proposes has a lot in common with the 
‘historical and social turn’ of Critical Theory that looks at the strategic context of political 
hegemony. Hegemony and Counter hegemony are mobilisations of social and cultural forces and 
the context of these hegemonic discourses is embedded in Gramscian ideas, institutions and 
culture. What emerges from the Cultural Political Economy School is similar to the neo-
Gramscian critical and cultural schools. However, a notable difference is that the Cultural 
Political School has adopted Foucault, Structural Marxism, elements of sociological perspectivism 
and subaltern studies to create an integrative analytical framework: but this should be 
conceptualised as an extension of the neo-Gramscian scholarship rather than a new analytical 
framework detached from its Gramscian roots. Cox, Gill, Hall, Persaud and Jessop are all 
concerned with the capitalist system and the neoliberal political economic discourse that has 
created global inequality. They are also troubled by the political hegemony and counter hegemony 
that characterises international, national, social and cultural discourses on power, production and 
social forces that create and sustain structures of inequality. In part, these neo-Gramscian 
analytical discourses may seem disconnected from the tiny island of Fiji in the South Pacific with 
references to international order, transnational hegemony, cultural and ethnic hegemony, and 
state power, but the overall themes that emerge provide for an analytical framework on 
hegemony and counter hegemony as multiple moments in history, where an indigenous 
nationalist historic bloc in Fiji imposed its political will in alliance with neoliberal local and 
transnational capital and defended its position against inter-ethnic alliances, which attempted to 
reframe Fiji's political and economic landscapes. 
 
Application of neo-Gramcian theory to Fiji 
 
The neo-Gramscian definitions on hegemony as the political power of the ethnic state and 
counter hegemony as popular resistance forms the conceptual basis for the neo-Gramscian 
model for Fiji that is used to study the character of social formations as historical moments in 
Fijian history. The neo-Gramscian interpretation of hegemony when applied to Fiji means the 
domination of the chiefly political and social forces in post-colonial Fiji until the coup of 
December 2006. It includes the neoliberal social and economic order that was championed by the 
indigenous chiefs in the 1980s and the overtly ethnicist rhetoric of the paramountcy of 
indigenous interest and the pervasive alliance among the indigenous authority, the capitalist class, 
and indigenous nationalists, which resulted in an elite autocratic ruling class that undermined 
deliberative initiatives, including inter-ethnic alliances for change. Counter hegemony in Fiji was 
in the form of inter-ethnic alliances between indigenous Fijians and Indo-Fijians in post-colonial 
Fiji, where the ruling elite was challenged by non-ethnic forces that regrouped in the 1980s as a 
response to the autocratic state and the neoliberal economic order. The influences of local and 
transnational capital led to painful neoliberal economic reforms in the 1980s, reflecting the larger 
global political economic ideology, promoted by Margaret Thatcher's United Kingdom and 
Ronald Reagan's United States (Harvey, 2007). 
In colonial Fiji, the social and cultural counter hegemonic forces were largely ethnic and as a 
result unable to form a successful countervailing force and replace the political and economic 
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order, even though attempts were made to overthrow the colonial system during the 1959 strike 
through interethnic collaboration (Heartfield, 2002: 75-86). Nevertheless, the re-configuration of 
social, economic and historical forces in 1987 (Lal, 1990; Lawson, 1991; Howard, 1991) and in 
1999 (Field, Baba and Nabobo-Baba, 2005) led to political counter hegemony and the 
transformation of the Fijian state along non-ethnic lines. However, these achievements were 
short-lived as indigenous nationalists reclaimed the state by force and established the hegemony 
of the indigenous Fijian chiefs with the assistance of the military. Since 2000, the military, which 
had played a central role in undermining counter hegemonic forces of the past, started its own 
counter hegemonic movement against indigenous nationalists and the chiefs, leading to military 
hegemony from December 2006 (Ramesh, 2011). These cycles of hegemony and counter 
hegemony form a unique model for the study of the ruling Fijian elite, historical moments, social 
forces and political power in Fiji. This model highlights the fragility of the Fijian state established 
after independence, including the political structures of command and control that were unable 
to withstand challenges from popular social forces. 
 
Post-colonial hegemony and counter hegemony in Fiji: 1970-2006 
 
The cultural hegemony of the chiefs in colonial Fiji was transformed into the political hegemony 
of the chiefs in post-colonial Fiji after independence. The chiefs were provided with a special 
status in colonial Fiji as official guardians of indigenous land, culture and tradition but in post-
colonial Fiji the Fijian state went through cycles of chiefly political hegemony (1970-1987), 
factionalisation of the indigenous bloc (1975, 1982, 1987, and 1999), inter-ethnic alliances (1987 
and 1999) and the assertion of indigenous coercive hegemony (1987, 2000 and 2006). These 
political and historical cycles demonstrate the fragility of the alliance among the chiefs, local and 
transnational capital and indigenous Fijian nationalists as a hegemonic bloc. Indigenous Fijian 
commoners increasingly started to see the promise of indigenous Fijian chiefs and the ruling class 
as incompatible with deliberative democracy, good governance, social empowerment, 
transparency and anti-corruption. Elite authoritarian structures embedded alongside chiefly 
political hegemony were also seen by the masses as anachronistic in terms of transparent and 
accountable government. Besides these cycles of control and resistance, post-colonial chiefly and 
elite hegemony operated at three levels before the December 2006 coup: within the indigenous 
Fijian community as neo-traditional authority, over the neoliberal state system, and over other 
ethnic groups, characterised by ethnic conflict between Indo-Fijians and indigenous Fijians. 
Among indigenous Fijians, there was a growing appreciation of democratic reforms and 
participatory democracy as opposed to prescriptive forms of hierarchy, elitism, economic 
liberalism and social control. The state in Fiji has been largely ethnic, where indigenous 
nationalists claimed perpetual right to political power premised upon the neo-traditional 
interpretation of indigenous rights, where chiefs were seen as natural political rulers, supported 
by nationalist commoner indigenous Fijians and their local and transnational business associates. 
Under this elite set up political discourse in Fiji caused and festered under political, economic and 
social conflict, with both indigenous Fijians and Indo-Fijians, who were caught up in history, 
cultural and social interpretation wars, each claiming a place in the nation where ethnocracy and 
ethnicity defined daily social discourses. 
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The first cycle of chiefly political hegemony – factionalisation of the indigenous bloc, inter-ethnic 
alliances and indigenous coercive hegemony – began when the political hegemony of the chiefs 
was consolidated in post-colonial Fiji by the chief-led Alliance Party, which formed alliances with 
the minority faction of the Indo-Fijian community and the Europeans (General Voters). The 
political setup of the Alliance Party was also premised upon an understanding whereby Indo-
Fijians without question would accept chiefly political leadership and the neoliberal economic 
order (Sofar, 1985: 55-74) characterised by local and transnational capital. The political and 
economic arrangements of the chiefs were challenged in 1975 by indigenous nationalists, led by 
Sakeasi Butadroka, who argued that the three-tier structure of the Alliance Party ought to be 
nullified because it was premised upon the exploitation of indigenous Fijians. While Butadroka 
highlighted important social issues affecting indigenous Fijians, his criticisms took a racist turn 
when he highlighted that Indo-Fijians were alien to indigenous Fijian culture and suggested they 
be promptly deported to India (Milne, 1981). The anti-Indo-Fijian rhetoric of the indigenous 
Fijian nationalists was based on concerns that Indo-Fijians had ambitions to utilise their 
economic strength to elbow their way into political power and usurp indigenous Fijian land.  
Buatdroka’s Fijian Nationalist Party fractured the indigenous political bloc established by the 
Alliance Party in the first 1977 election, allowing the Indo-Fijian NFP to win office in April. 
However, divisions and indecisions on the part of the NFP leadership led to the intervention of 
the Governor General, Ratu Sir George Cakobau, who restored the chiefly political bloc (Ali, 
1979: 76). As expected, in the second 1977 election, the indigenous nationalists realised that 
division meant loss of political power and heeded the advice of Alliance campaigners, voting the 
Alliance Party leader, Ratu Mara, back  into office. In 1982, the indigenous bloc further 
fragmented with the formation of a region-based Western United Front, which formed inter-
ethnic alliances with the NFP but was unsuccessful in winning office because it was seen by 
indigenous Fijians as a party promoted to divide the community and repeat the outcome of the 
April 1977 election (Lal, 1983: 134-159). However, in 1987, the Fiji Labour Party, which was 
based on inter-ethnic class alliances between indigenous Fijians and Indo-Fijians, dislodged the 
chiefly elite from political power, resulting in military intervention and the re-assertion of chiefly 
political hegemony (Robertson and Tamanisau, 1988). The political trajectory of the 1980s 
highlighted divisions among indigenous Fijians as well as Indo-Fijians and these divisions created 
new political alliances, based mainly on inter-ethnic and inter-class alliances that challenged 
chiefly hegemony and the neoliberal economic order (Sutherland, 1992; Taylor, 1987) that 
exploited both Indo-Fijian and indigenous Fijians. 
 
Inter-ethnic counter hegemony: 1987 and 1999 
 
The FLP was the first political party in Fiji that was based on inter-ethnic collaboration between 
indigenous Fijians and Indo-Fijians. The overt class and non-ethnic characteristics of the FLP 
posed a serious challenge to the chief-led and highly ethnicised Alliance Party because the FLP 
successfully provided an alternative to the political hegemony of the chiefs. Ten years after 
independence, Fiji continued to have an overspecialised economy with guaranteed access to 
European markets under the Lome Conventions. In the recessions of the 1970s, Fiji remained 
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largely shielded from the down-turn in the international market, but by 1981 sluggish growth in 
the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and a 30 per cent decline in the terms of trade caused 
national income to fall. The Alliance Party blamed global recession for the economic woes of the 
country (Browne, 1989: 41), and became increasingly hostile towards trade unions. According to 
Michael Howard: 
“Between 1981 and 1982, the government placed a virtual freeze on new positions in the public service 
and many vacant posts were not filled. There was little hiring in the public sector and redundancies, 
sometimes on a relatively large scale, became increasingly commonplace. In particular, larger foreign 
owned firms initiated ‘rationalisation’ moves entailing laying off a significant number of workers (Howard, 
1987: 114).” 
The growing anti-union rhetoric of the Alliance government caused frustrations within the trade 
union movement and, in the middle of 1982, a Public Service Review Team recommended 
restructuring the public service, which was rejected by all stakeholders as unnecessary. By 1984, 
the Alliance government announced a public-sector-wide wage freeze that further alienated and 
infuriated the unions. Fiji’s largest trade union organisation, the Fiji Trade Union Council 
(FTUC), condemned the actions of the Alliance and threatened a national strike. In response the 
Alliance promised that it would declare a national emergency and use the armed forces to provide 
essential services. The FTUC and the Fiji Public Service Association (FPSA) began to scope the 
possibility of forming a political party to challenge the Alliance Party in the 1987 elections. While 
the FTUC and the FPSA were plotting the demise of the Alliance, the government infuriated the 
teachers by announcing the Volunteer Service Scheme (VSS), where graduate teachers would be 
employed for up to two years while they awaited appointment from the Ministry of Education. 
Under the VSS, the government agreed to pay a salary of $3,000 while the committee-run schools 
in the rural areas would meet housing and other costs. According to Brij Lal (1986: 143) ‘the 
government decided to move away from the former practice of automatic absorption of graduate 
teachers in late 1982, justifying its new policy in terms of financial restraints facing the 
government’. The Fijian Teachers Confederation (FTC) called the VSS unprofessional, ill-
conceived and exploitative. Members of both the Fiji Teachers Union (FTU) and the Fijian 
Teachers Association (FTA) joined forces with the FPSA and the FTUC to oppose the policies 
of the Alliance government. The Minister for Education in the Alliance government, Ahmed Ali, 
was in particular targeted by the FTU as the unions forced the VSS issue to an arbitration 
hearing, which in 1985 ruled that the VSS was unlawful. 
By the middle of the 1980s, unions in Fiji were increasingly politicised due to the tension with the 
government. Noisy demonstrations were held in cities and towns across the country. However, 
the opposition NFP failed to capitalise on the stand-off between the unions and the government 
and started to fragment after its leader Jai Ram Reddy quit the party in 1983 only to be succeeded 
by the former leader, Siddiq Koya. With Koya back as leader, divisions within the NFP 
resurfaced and in 1986, Koya was forced to resign and Nadi lawyer Harish Sharma took over as 
party leader. By then, a number of prominent NFP members had left the party or had joined the 
FLP. Harish Sharma realised that the NFP had become a spent force in Fiji politics, particularly 
following its defeats in the 1972, 1977 and 1982 elections and, further, struggled to get support 
from indigenous Fijians. Hence, the party contemplated a coalition with the FLP.  
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In 1985, the Indo-Fijian and the indigenous Fijian members of the FPSA and the FTUC joined 
forces to form the FLP. The party was led by an indigenous Fijian medical doctor, Timoci 
Bavadra, who articulated an alternative multiethnic vision for Fiji based on the equality of all 
communities. After the formation of the FLP, the party turned out to be a formidable political 
force in Fiji within a very short period of time. Dr Bavadra was a former President of the FPSA 
and Assistant Director of Primary and Preventive Health and was motivated to bring changes to 
the culture of corruption and chiefly entitlements that plagued the Alliance administration.  
In what was a meteoric rise of the party, FLP candidate, Bob Kumar, won the Suva City Council 
elections and became the mayor of Suva in 1985. Challenges to the hegemony of the chiefs in the 
1977 elections by both the FNP and the NFP were defeated due to strong appeals to indigenous 
Fijian communal sentiments but in 1985 a new counter hegemonic force challenged the chiefly 
leadership of the Alliance Party and for the first time this counter hegemonic movement was 
multiracial in character. That caused concerns among Alliance strategists and, as expected, the 
Alliance government resorted to its old tactics and accused the FLP of ‘left’ inclination because 
many in the party espoused social democracy as opposed to the pro-West liberalism of the 
Alliance. Despite voting as a bloc with indigenous Fijians in the past, the General Elector 
community was divided in 1987, as were many indigenous Fijians living in the urban areas, who 
were concerned by the rising cost of living and the privileged position of the chiefs and their 
clans in national affairs. Feeling the winds of change sweeping Fiji’s political landscape, 
indigenous Fijian chiefs started a campaign of fear against the FLP and its coalition partner, the 
NFP. On 25 September 1986, a Senator appointed by the Great Council of Chiefs warned all 
races not to push the indigenous Fijians. Ratu Mara also warned politicians not to take politics 
into the Great Council of Chiefs meeting (The Fiji Sun, 29 August 1986). The chiefs were 
essentially warning Indo-Fijian leaders that indigenous Fijian chiefs were the natural rulers of the 
country and any attempts to oust the chiefs would cause political instability. 
The 1987 general election was the first real test for inter-ethnic alliances under the 1970 
Constitution. Unlike in previous elections, the Alliance Party was accused of continuing with the 
colonial policy of divide and rule. Moreover, the party was accused of protecting and preserving 
chiefly privilege in the community while social conditions of commoner indigenous Fijians 
deteriorated. On 21 February 1987, the FLP-NFP Coalition launched its manifesto at the Girmit 
Centre in Lautoka. In the manifesto, the Coalition promised better prices through securing the 
best marketing arrangement for Fiji goods, greater milling efficiency, reduction of cane 
transportation costs, better roads, cheaper fertilisers, fee-free education, and improvement in 
teacher training (Bain and Baba, 1988: 87-89). The coalition continued with its frontal attack on 
the Alliance, arguing that corruption had become endemic in indigenous Fijian politics and 
promising to enact anti-corruption legislation if elected. The coalition noted that the Alliance 
government had placed indigenous interest behind the commercial interests of multinational 
companies. In March 1986, a block of 1,062 acres belonging to Namoso landowners was leased 
to Western Mining for 21 years. The villagers were not happy with the terms of the lease, and in 
February 1986 approached the FLP leader, Dr Bavadra, for assistance. The villagers filed a $10 
million claim against the Emperor Gold Mining Company; and at the centre of the Namoso 
struggle was the manager of the Emperor Gold Mines, Jeffrey Reid, who was a close ally of Ratu 
Mara and the Alliance Party. Reid supported efforts to revive the Vatukoula branch of the Fijian 
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Association in response to the FLP’s growing influence in the area (Howard, 1992: 32-34). Reid 
went further and accused the FLP of damaging the company’s reputation. In response, the 
Coalition charged that Emperor Gold Mining had exploited its workers and used its political 
influence to cheat indigenous landowners of their rightful entitlements, accused the Alliance of 
extractive corruption and singled out Ratu Mara as the wealthiest man in Fiji by alleging that 
Mara had built a complex in Suva with a government loan and leased it back to the Ministry of 
Education. Some of the other charges of corruption by the Coalition were abuse of a hurricane 
relief fund, associations with under-world figures, fraudulent investments and corrupt deals with 
big businesses (Lawson, 1991: 247).  
The Alliance Party denied charges of corruption and promised new jobs, selective privatisation 
and the establishment of export processing zones. Ratu Mara and the Alliance continued to argue 
that the policies of the Coalition would destroy chiefly hegemony, threaten indigenous Fijian 
land, and undermine indigenous religion and tradition. The leader of the FLP, Dr Bavadra, 
quickly dispelled the attacks from the Alliance as another elaborate invention of a party that had 
abused traditional chiefly authority to keep itself in power for the past 17 years. More 
importantly, by 1987 the coalition had become a powerful counter-hegemonic force comprising 
union leaders of different ethnicities, former politicians disgruntled with race-based politics, 
members of the urban middle class, working class indigenous Fijians and social activists. Helen 
Ware (2005: 435-454) notes that in 1987 the Indo-Fijians were able to create class-based political 
coalitions, which gave their party political predominance through the inclusion of poor, urban 
indigenous Fijians. Moreover, the FLP espoused an overtly non-aligned foreign policy much to 
the frustration of the Alliance and the West, which were concerned about Soviet, Indian and 
Libyan influences in the Pacific.  
The coalition between the FLP and the NFP represented an alliance between the left and centre-
right parties, consisting of Indo-Fijians, General Voters and urban indigenous Fijian professional 
and working classes, farmers and small businesses. The Coalition had become a powerful 
multiethnic political bloc by 1987, which was made possible by the factionalisation of the 
indigenous polity. The coalition agenda was to de-ethnicise politics by removing the 
discrimination and clientelism of the Alliance Party. The Alliance Party, in contrast, was the party 
of the right with its support for foreign multinationals, medium and small businesses, rural 
indigenous Fijians and chiefs. The Alliance continued with the colonial policy of reinforcing 
cultural and ethnic divisions by implementing discriminatory policies in favour of indigenous 
Fijians. Moreover, indigenous chiefs in the Alliance portrayed themselves as the most 
experienced persons in managing Fiji’s diverse communal interests and further argued that 
communal harmony could only be guaranteed with the continuation of the chiefly political 
hegemony.  
The Alliance Party’s divide and rule strategy failed in 1987 and the Coalition won the election by 
capturing 28 out of 52 seats. According to Brij Lal (1988: 45), a majority of the indigenous Fijians 
still supported the Alliance Party but what was also important to note was the fact that 24 per 
cent of indigenous Fijians voted for other parties, indicating that the party of the chiefs was no 
longer regarded as the sole voice of the indigenous Fijians. The General Electors, like urban 
indigenous Fijians, swung towards the Coalition by a massive 8 per cent. The swing away from 
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the Alliance was enough to compromise chiefly hegemony In the Gramscian sense; the 
ascendancy of the coalition was made possible by its strategic political positioning and the ability 
of the Coalition to create an alternative historic bloc within two years since the formation of the 
FLP. 
Unlike the inter-ethnic counter hegemony of 1987, the 1999 counter hegemony was entirely of a 
different flavour. While in 1987 the Fiji Labour Party Coalition consisted of members of multi-
ethnic trade unions including urban indigenous Fijians and general voters, the People’s Coalition 
consisted of disgruntled indigenous Fijians from the FAP, Party of National Unity (PANU) and 
the VLV who were disillusioned with the chief-sponsored SVT Party. In 1999, the Fiji Labour 
Party was very much focused on its Indo-Fijian constituencies but still maintained some support 
from the urban indigenous Fijian trade unionists. The People’s Coalition, even though on the 
face of it seeming like an inter-ethnic collaboration, was a combination of a multitude of 
indigenous and Indo-Fijian political interests. 
The vote count started in the evening of 15 May 1999. By 16 May, it was clear that the FLP was 
going to win a majority of Indo-Fijian communal seats. By 17 May, the SVT was in serious 
trouble and so was its coalition partner, the NFP. On 18 May 1999, the election results were out 
and to the surprise of the FLP supporters, the party won 37 seats – 19 Indo-Fijian Communal 
and 18 Open seats. The FAP won 10 seats and PANU 4. On the opposite side, the NFP was 
totally annihilated, but its coalition partner SVT managed to win 8 seats and the United General 
Party won 2. The VLV won 3 seats and the nationalists captured 2. Rotuma won a single seat as 
usual and there were 5 Independents elected. Following the final vote count, the FLP convened a 
meeting where elected members agreed to nominate Mahendra Chaudhry as the first Indo-Fijian 
Prime Minister of Fiji. Unfortunately, FLP’s coalition partners – the FAP and the PANU – were 
not happy with the decision. The leader of the PANU, Apisai Tora, criticised the Indo-Fijians for 
bloc voting and being insensitive to indigenous Fijian interest. A similar sentiment was echoed by 
the outgoing Prime Minister, Sitiveni Rabuka, who tendered his resignation to the President of 
Fiji on 18 May 1999. In a speech to the nation that afternoon, Rabuka expressed concern over 
the way in which Indo-Fijians voted for the FLP. Also lamenting over the election results was the 
leader of the NFP, Jai Ram Reddy, who accepted the verdict of the people.  
While Chaudhry started work on his new cabinet, indigenous Fijian political parties lashed out at 
the FLP as well as at Indo Fijians. VLV’s Poseci Bune called for indigenous Fijian parties to unite 
against Indo-Fijians. A similar call was made by the nationalist leader Sakeasi Butadroka. 
Meanwhile, the FAP advised the FLP that it wanted Adi Kuini Speed to become Prime Minister. 
However, the FLP reminded its coalition partners that it was agreed beforehand that the party 
winning the most seats would choose the position of Prime Minister. While the debate on who 
should be the Prime Minister continued, on 19 May 1999 at 11 am Mahendra Chaudhry was 
sworn in by the President as the first Indo-Fijian Prime Minister of Fiji.  
Chaudhry had been elected to Parliament in the April 1987 general election and held the Finance 
Minister’s portfolio before being deposed in a military coup on 14 May. Since then, Chaudhry 
had remained at the forefront of politics, constantly agitating for democratic reforms. In 1991, 
Chaudhry organised nation-wide strikes against the interim government’s Sugar Masters Award. 
In addition, he was instrumental in campaigning against the 1990 Constitution. In 1992, 
 
Sanjay Ramesh                                                                                                                       | 297 
 
Chaudhry was elected as a Member of Parliament and continued to fight for social justice. 
Among his most notable motions were the ones on corruption and on the select committee on 
agricultural leases. In 1996, Chaudhry remained steadfast in his resolve to lobby for a full 
implementation of the Reeves Commission Report. In 1997, he fought hard to ensure that 
drought-stricken Indo-Fijian farmers were forwarded loans on generous terms, and remained an 
overt critic of privatisation and corporatisation.  
After Chaudhry was sworn in as the Prime Minister of Fiji, the FAP accepted the Fiji Labour 
Party’s endorsement of Adi Kuini Speed and Tupeni Baba for the position of Deputy Prime 
Ministers of Fiji. Meanwhile reports surfaced that arsonists had targeted the Department of 
Lands at the Government Building on the night of 19 May. According to The Daily Post (1999), 
‘the fire was noticed at about 7.38 pm. But, quick action from police and the fire department 
helped control the blaze. Deputy Chief Fire officer Isireli Qasenivalu said they have ruled out the 
possibility that the fire was caused by an electric fault’.  
By 21 May, PANU agreed to join the FLP and the FAP. Prime Minister Mahendra Chaudhry 
went a step further and invited SVT and the VLV to join in a ‘Government of National Unity’. 
Under the 1997 constitution, only those parties securing 10 per cent of total votes could be 
invited to join cabinet. However, Chaudhry argued that for the sake of unity and stability, parties 
receiving less than the required threshold should be invited as well. The VLV party considered 
Chaudhry’s offer and to the surprise of many agreed to join the new cabinet. The SVT party 
leader Sitiveni Rabuka requested four cabinet positions in the new government, including the 
post of Deputy Prime Minister and when his request was refused, he withdrew from any further 
consultations with the new government. 
The 1999 election saw the realignment of political forces in Fiji. PANU, which was a regionally 
based party in the west, formed an alliance with the FLP to ensure that they had political 
representation in government. The FAP was a more urban-based political movement but was 
influenced by the chiefs who were disenchanted with the SVT party. The VLV had a similar 
political setup, with dissident chiefs and supporters punishing the SVT for changing the 
constitution. In the 1999 election, indigenous votes were split four ways among the SVT, the 
FAP, the VLV and the PANU. Indo-Fijians had only two choices, the FLP and the NFP, and a 
majority chose the FLP for continuing the fight for political equality under the 1997 Constitution. 
At the end of the election, the chief-led political order since the 1987 coups had collapsed and 
the FLP once again formed a counter-hegemonic bloc with the support of indigenous parties 
seeking a voice under the new multiethnic constitution. The indigenous ideology based on the 
supremacy of the hegemony of chiefs had crumbled due to divisions, conflict and rivalries among 
the chiefs themselves. More importantly perhaps, the outcome of the 1999 election reflected the 
failure of Prime Minister Rabuka’s strategy of amalgamating majority indigenous Fijian and Indo-
Fijian parties into a political bloc that supported chiefly hegemony. In hindsight, Rabuka’s 
strategy further fragmented indigenous votes and deepened competition for political power 
within indigenous groups. With the establishment of a new political counter hegemonic bloc led 
by the FLP, indigenous divisions including divisions among chiefs continued to intensify after the 
1999 election, resulting in the May 2000 coup. 
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Military and interim government hegemony: 2006 to 2014 
 
The 2006 coup was unlike previous coups. Bainimarama’s actions against the SDL party and the 
chiefs of Fiji were based on a non-ethnicist rhetoric. The military ousted the government because 
it believed it was racist and corrupt. The 2006 coup saw the dismantling of the chiefly hegemony 
that had continued since independence, interrupted only in 1987 and 1999 by inter-ethnic 
alliances. Indigenous institutions that entrenched chiefly cultural and political hegemony were 
targeted for dissolution by the military. They included the Native Land Trust Board, the Fijian 
Affairs Board, Fijian Holdings Ltd and the Great Council of Chiefs. Moreover, provincial 
councils were audited and individuals suspected of corruption were removed from office. The 
2006 coup leaders transformed the Republic of Fiji Military Forces from an ethnic institution to 
an agent of political and social change, but this transformation was turbulent and many opposed 
to the military accused it of serious human rights abuses.  
Following the coup, a number of groups, some sympathetic to the deposed government, 
protested against the military takeover. The military, in response, arrested and detained a number 
of individuals, resulting in condemnation from human rights’ organisations. Fiji’s Citizens’ 
Constitutional Forum (CCF) condemned the actions of the military in intimidating members of 
the public who spoke against the military regime. CCF President, Reverend Aquila Yabaki stated 
that while the CCF deplored the mistreatment as unnecessary it advised that protesters should be 
attuned to the fact that there has been a military takeover and it was not business as usual. Joining 
the CCF was Pacific Resource Concerns Centre Director, Tupou Vere, who called for a full 
return to the rule of law (Fiji Village News, 2006). The military continued to detain members of 
pro-democracy groups and banned Virisila Buadromo, Imraz Iqbal, Laisa Digitaki, Pita 
Waqavonovono and Jacqueline Koroi from leaving the country (Fiji TV, 2006). The deposed 
Fijian Affairs Board chief executive, Adi Litia Qionibaravi was taken in for questioning by the 
military on 29 December as protests against the military spread to indigenous Fijians living 
overseas. 
Detentions and physical abuse of critics of the military created concerns among a number of 
international human rights’ organisations. On 16 February 2007 Amnesty International urged the 
interim government of Fiji to comply with its obligations under international human rights’ law. 
According to the Amnesty report, Amnesty International stated it was highly concerned over 
President Ratu Josefa Iloilo Uluivuda’s announcement on 18 January 2007 of a decree, known as 
the Immunity (Fiji Military Government Intervention) Promulgation 2007, which granted ‘full 
and unconditional immunity from all criminal or civil or legal or military disciplinary or 
professional proceedings or consequences’ to the disciplined forces in the country involved in the 
coup and all other persons who acted under their command, in the run-up to 5 December 2006 
until 5 January 2007, the day after President Ratu Josefa resumed executive authority over the 
interim government. Despite repeated assurances by the Interim Attorney-General, Aiyaz Sayed-
Khaiyum, that the Fiji Human Rights Commission would handle complaints concerning human 
rights violations with the interim government’s full support, the fact that the persons covered by 
the above decree could not be held accountable for any human rights violations that they may 
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have committed seriously jeopardised the state of human rights and the rule of law in Fiji. This 
decree entrenched the legacy of impunity experienced in Fiji.  
The military returned to barracks but the interim government that was established supported the 
objectives of the military coup and one of its actions was to suspend the Great Council of Chiefs 
indefinitely. The composition of the GCC was determined under the Fijian Affairs Act and the 
Council was given the role of nominating the President under the 1997 Constitution. The interim 
Minister of Fijian Affairs, Heritage, Provincial Development and Multi Ethnic Affairs, Ratu Epeli 
Ganilau, exercised his powers under the Fijian Affairs Act and initiated the Fijian Affairs (Great 
Council of Chiefs) suspension Regulations of 2007, which came into effect from 13 April, 2007.  
With the GCC suspended and SDL supporters and nominees purged from state-owned 
enterprises and the public service, the interim government formulated and distributed the 
People’s Charter for Change and Progress in 2008. Developed by John Sami, a consultant from 
New Zealand, the Charter aimed to promote multiracial political strategy and formed the 
framework for the new Constitution Review Commission (CRC) established after the abrogation 
of the 1997 Constitution in 2009. Stewart Firth (2015: 110) argued that Bainimarama’s approach 
was that ‘if the courts were thought to be wrong in reaching judgment, they should be ignored 
and the constitution abrogated’. The CRC was compromised of constitutional expert Professor 
Yash Ghai, academic Satendra Nandan and former minister Taufa Vakatale. In total, the CRC 
received 7,000 submissions and recommended a ‘144 member National People’s Assembly 
including civil society appointees and representatives of the GCC’ (Fraenkel, 2014: 477). The 
interim government, including the President, criticised the recommendations of the CRC and 
initiated its own consultation process, which received only 1,093 responses (Fraenkel, 2014: 479). 
Furthermore, the 2013 Constitution was drafted behind closed doors and imposed restrictive 
conventions on trade union members and those opposed to the military-backed regime. 
Already, the union movement was incensed by the Essential Industries Decree that outlawed 
strike action in ‘essential’ sectors of the economy and journalists and news organisations 
pondered on the utility of the Media Decree, which banned majority foreign shares in the local 
media. According to the Decree, ‘any media organisation which fails to comply with this 
requirement shall cease to operate as a media organisation, and shall also be liable for an offence 
under the Decree. At this stage, Fiji Times is the media organisation that needs to comply with 
the ownership requirements, and this represents a major challenge for the country’s longest 
serving newspaper’ (Fiji Broadcasting Commission, 2010). Critics argued that actions against the 
unions and the media aimed at thwarting any unfavourable assessment of the interim government 
or the military. 
 
FijiFirst and military hegemony 
 
Fiji went to the polls on 17 September 2014 and this election was the first democratic election 
since the government of former Prime Minister Laisenia Qarase was deposed in a bloodless coup 
on 6 December 2006 by the Republic of Fiji Military Forces. The election was held under Fiji’s 
2013 Constitution that required election of a 50-member parliament under a proportional voting 
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system, where political parties and independent candidates had to win more than 5 per cent of 
the total vote to win a seat in parliament. Unlike other proportional systems, Fiji has a single 
national constituency without any regions or districts. The ballot paper consisted of numbers 
from 135 to 382 and each number was randomly allocated to a candidate who represented a 
registered political party. There were two independent candidates but the proportional system 
favoured larger political parties, especially those with popular political leaders. The new electoral 
decree on the registration of political parties provided information on the registration of political 
parties, the conduct of elections, and the role of the Supervisor of Elections in managing the 
election process. Some 92 international observers from 13 countries were in Fiji to observe the 
September 2014 election, which was contested by seven political parties including FijiFirst, Social 
Democratic Liberal Party (SODELPA), People’s Democratic Party (PDP), NFP, FLP, One Fiji, 
and Fiji United Freedom Party. 
Before the September 2014 elections, the military established itself as a ‘guarantor’ of peace and 
stability in Fiji and many military officials served in the interim government, indicating that the 
military fully supported the interim government, the visions espoused in the People’s Charter, the 
2013 Fiji Constitution and the FijiFirst Party. Jon Fraenkel (2015: 52) analysed that ‘92.6 per cent 
of the soldiers supported FijiFirst in the general election’, supporting the argument that the 
military was fully behind the reforms initiated by Voreqe Bainimarama. It also highlights, as 
suggested by Jukka Siikala (2014: 224), that the military in Fiji had transformed itself into a ‘tribe’, 
which ‘looked for support amongst Indo-Fijians’ who believe that Bainimarama’s rule has ‘curbed 
indigenous nationalism which had long been a threat to political order’ (Norton, 2015: 115). Brij 
Lal expands the ‘military tribe’ thesis by arguing that the 2013 constitution gives the military ‘ a 
guardian role as the defender of national interest (not an elected parliament) and it can 
legitimately use that provision to intervene if it feels its interests are under threat’ (Lal, 2015: 86-
87). Former Fiji military officer, Jone Baledrokadroka (2015: 131), argues that the ‘military tribe’ 
in Fiji is a form of super confederacy, where Bainimarama ‘enticed a clique of officers with 
accelerated promotion and handsome salary increases that has enabled him to build a strong 
political base, thus using military as a nation building institution.’ The military has in fact 
established itself in Fiji as a hegemonic entity, adopting a non-ethnic narrative of the interim 
regime from 2006 to 2014 and the FijiFirst political party from 2014 onwards. This non-ethnic 
narrative promotes, among other things, ethnic equality, social responsibility and revisionist 
discourses against institutions created by colonial government, including the Great Council of 
Chiefs and the Fijian Affairs Board.  
Closely allied to the military was the hegemonic FijiFirst party, led by Voreqe Bainimarama, who 
modelled the party along the principles enshrined in the People’s Charter of 2008, which laid out 
non-ethnic political and social foundations for Fiji. FijiFirst believes in the separation of state and 
religion, a common name of ‘Fijian’ for all Fiji citizens, allocation of state resources based on 
community needs instead of race, fair agricultural leases, a land bank for indigenous landowners, 
anti-corruption measures spearheaded by the Fiji Independent Commission Against Corruption, 
reducing violence and exploitation against women and children, affordable housing, a national 
employment scheme, an infrastructure investment plan, agri-business diversification, reducing 
bureaucratic red tape for foreign investment, modernising the legal framework with greater access 
to legal aid, encouraging women in the workplace, lowering youth unemployment, being tough 
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on sacrilege and other criminal acts, free water, reasonable rates for electricity and gas, fee-free 
education, investment in higher education, subsidised milk for primary school students, and equal 
citizenry. The hegemony of the military and the FijiFirst Party in Fiji is firmly embedded in the 
constitutional, parliamentary, social and historical structures and has cross-ethnic appeal among 
Fiji’s multiethnic community. 
The Social Democratic Liberal Party (SODELPA), is a more indigenous-Fijian communal-
oriented party and the support for her campaign was provided by former Prime Minister Laisenia 
Qarase. SODELPA criticised ‘Fijian’ as a common name, wanted Fiji to be a declared a Christian 
state, preferred changes to land lease money distribution in favour of indigenous chiefs, return of 
the political role of the Great Council of Chiefs, reinstatement of Fijian Affairs Board 
scholarships, a restructured i-taukei Land Trust Board, the possibility of bringing back the 1997 
Constitution, the reform of the Republic of Fiji Military Forces, establishment of Indigenous 
Fijian foreshore rights via a Qoliqoli law, review of all decrees between 2006 and 2014, and 
implementation of social justice and affirmative action programs for indigenous Fijians, similar to 
what existed during the reign of the former SDL Government (2001 to 2006).  
The FLP, the People’s Democratic Party and the NFP supported the reinstatement of the Great 
Council of Chiefs but criticised SODELPA on their stand against “Fijian” as a common name 
and on introduction of a Christian state. The FLP was led by former Prime Minister Mahendra 
Chaudhry, who was disqualified from standing in the September 2014 election due to his 
conviction on Fiji’s foreign exchange law violations. The party continued to campaign for the 
rights of workers and farmers. However, the People’s Democratic Party also had workers’ rights 
as part of its election manifesto. Led by a former Fiji Labour Party member and trade unionist, 
Felix Anthony, the People’s Democratic Party criticised the Essential Industries Decree, claiming 
that the Decree had diminished the rights of workers in specific industries such as tourism, 
infrastructure and emergency services. The National Federation Party was led by Professor 
Biman Prasad, who resigned from the University of the South Pacific as Professor of Economics 
to lead the party. The National Federation Party vowed to reduce Value Added Tax (VAT), 
address poverty, unemployment and inflation. The party called for 99-year leases so that there 
was some certainty for tenants with agricultural leases. 
The One Fiji party was led by Filimoni Vosarogo. The party planned to boost Fiji’s economy by 
creating more local jobs and investing in education. The party highlighted that the issues of 
economic development required a 10-year development plan. The Fiji United Freedom Party was 
led by Jagath Karunaratne and the party planned to provide a platform for Fiji’s youth to voice 
their issues. In 2011, Karunaratne, a Sri-Lankan-born Fiji citizen, was accused of painting anti-
government graffiti. 
There were in total 590,000 registered voters, out of which 496,364 (83.9 per cent) voted in the 
2014 general election. The voting was carried out in 1500 polling stations, where voters showed 
their identity cards to electoral officers who verified their name on the voter list, marked their 
finger with an indelible ink and then issued them the ballot paper, whereon the voter marked 
with a cross or a tick his or her preferred candidate’s number and deposited the ballot into a 
secured ballot box. Most of the voting on 17 September was completed before 3 pm and the 
provisional results were published in the morning of 18 September. 
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The provisional election figures placed FijiFirst in the lead with 60 per cent of the seats, followed 
by SODELPA and the National Federation Party. The Fiji Labour Party, the People’s 
Democratic Party, One Fiji and the Fiji United Freedom Party failed to secure the required 5 per 
cent threshold of 24,818 votes. 
In the afternoon of 18 September, the Fiji Labour Party, People’s Democratic Party, SODELPA, 
One Fiji and the National Federation party issued a joint statement in a letter, arguing that there 
were irregularities in the conduct of the election and requested the count of the votes be 
suspended. The Supervisor of Elections responded that the allegations from political parties were 
too general and refused to suspend counting. On 19 September, political parties questioning the 
election produced a list of ‘evidence’ claiming that extra ballot papers were printed, seals on the 
ballot boxes were broken, the count was suspended without explanation and ballot papers were 
tampered with. The Election Office rejected the claims on 20 September and the full and final 
result of the election was published on 21 September.  
The new parliament in Fiji represents a quasi-inter-ethnic hegemony with 14 Indo-Fijians MPs in 
the new FijiFirst government, despite the fact that the ‘military remains almost exclusively Taukei 
and the public service disproportionately Taukei’ (Madraiwiwi, 2015: 58). According to Steven 
Ratuva (2015: 147-148), the election result showed that ‘SODELPA was able to attract the rural 
based voters and those committed to the preservation of Taukei customary ways and FijiFirst was 
able to attract urban voters and those who preferred reform of Taukei institutions as well as 
socio-economic development’. Nevertheless, FijiFirst did manage to establish an inter-ethnic 
alliance and, as Jon Fraenkel (2015: 49) noted, the 2014 general election in Fiji had the 
‘geographical configuration of political loyalties that echoed the pattern witnessed 15 years earlier 
when the Fiji Labour Party built an alliance that toppled SVT’. However, the verdict still remains 
open as to how this inter-ethnic hegemony supported by the military will play out. 
There are concerns that there are centripetal inter-ethnic social forces and centrifugal ethnic 
forces competing for political hegemony in Fiji within hegemonic and counter-hegemonic 
political discourses. The indigenous Fijian nationalists continue to argue for a greater entitlement 
to state power, whereas Indo-Fijians and other minority groups emphasise political equality as the 
preferred political direction. The tensions between nationalist social forces and multicultural and 
ethnically inclusive forces have created diverging hegemonic narratives that reflect divisions 
within Fiji’s communities. These divisions may seem benign but highlight the undercurrent of 
Fijian political conceptualisation of indigenous and others, out-groups and in-groups and 
perceptions about the self and the other. Political equality may have been established under the 
2013 Fiji Constitution, but competing claims on identity and nation have caused fractions and 
factions, with emotions and cultural sensitivities at an all-time high among the local communities. 
How the current FijiFirst government reconciles these diverging views on state, nation and 




Whilst neo-Gramscian approaches focused on historical and social contradictions of the capitalist 
system, the analytical framework of Cox, Gill, Hall, Persaud, and Jessop provides the theoretical 
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tools for extending the study of social and historical forces to post-colonial communities such as 
Fiji. Hegemony not only entails the material capabilities to dominate, control and influence but 
the ability to disrupt anti-hegemony views via coercive interventions. Cultural forces in Fiji, 
including social and historical forces, were aligned to the interest of the ruling classes and hence 
the political hegemony of the indigenous chiefs in Fiji was successful in establishing a three-tiered 
structure of indigenous neo-traditional influence, domination of local and transnational capital 
and indigenous Fijian nationalism. But in assembling and lining up historical, social and cultural 
forces, the ideological fault lines emerged, leading to counter-hegemony where opposing 
historical, economic, social and cultural interpretations led to inter-ethnic alliances and strategic 
political action. The hegemony of the chiefs in Fiji was undermined by a non-ethnic historic bloc, 
but the military intervened and restored the elite. However, in Fiji the military changed from 
preserving the political hegemony of indigenous chiefs and nationalists to a counter-hegemonic 
movement, embracing inter-ethnic alliances as a new political discourse for Fiji and, as a result, 
indigenous nationalist forces were not only put on notice but were dislodged from political power 
in 2006. Following the coup, opposition to the military-backed regime was outlawed as the 
government embarked on a non-ethnic political model of hegemony, where all ethnic groups in 
Fiji were provided equal rights. This model, informed by the People’s Charter, led to the 2013 Fiji 
Constitution and the 2014 general elections which established FijiFirst and military hegemony. 
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